Abstract-Enhancement of system capacity is one of the objectives of the fifth generation (5G) networks in which deviceto-device (D2D) communications is anticipated to play a crucial role. This can be achieved by devising efficient resource allocation strategies for the D2D users. Most of the works in resource allocation assume full knowledge of the channel states. However, transmitting these increases the control overhead and leads to wastage of power. Apart from the channel gains between the CUs and the base station (BS), in order to accommodate D2D users, the channel gains that need to be transmitted are those between the cellular users (CUs) and the D2D users and between each D2D pair. The cardinality of these channel gains is the number of CUs times the D2D receivers and the number of D2D pairs. In this paper, with partial channel state information (CSI) at the BS, we address the problem of D2D resource allocation and ensure that the interference from the D2D users do not jeopardize the communications of the CUs. With partial CSI, existing algorithms determine the Nash equilibrium in a distributed manner, which in general may not maximize the social utility as the players try to maximize their own utilities. This is the first work in D2D resource allocation with partial CSI in which within a game theoretic framework, an optimal D2D resource allocation algorithm is proposed which maximizes the social utility of the D2D players without any inter-D2D interference. We consider the channel to exhibit path loss. Next, we consider both slow and fast fading with CU mobility and propose a heuristic algorithm. We validate the performance of our proposed algorithms through simulation results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Device-to-device (D2D) communication is envisioned to be a promising component of the fifth generation (5G) wireless networks. It explores the possibility of short range communication between two D2D users in an underlay Long Term Evolution (LTE) network so that they can reuse the radio resources already allocated to cellular users (CUs) through efficient resource allocation algorithms. The CUs are treated as primary users which means that their quality of service do not get affected due to the transmissions of D2D users.
A. Motivation
Most of the previous works on D2D resource allocation assume perfect channel state information (CSI) [1] - [3] . This implies that the base station (BS) as a central resource allocation unit has knowledge of all the channel gains among the different communicating entities from which the BS can determine the achievable rates of all the communication links in order to design an optimal resource allocation algorithm that is centralized. The channel gain from a CU to the BS and from a D2D transmitter to the BS are known because every user equipment (UE) transmits its channel quality indicator (CQI) to the BS either periodically or aperiodically [4] . However, it is difficult for the BS to determine the CQI between a D2D pair and that between a CU and a D2D receiver. For a fast fading channel, even if these channel gains are known, conveying them to the BS in every time slot requires significant control overhead and power. When some of the channel gains are not known at the BS, it is known as partial CSI. Thus, partial CSI is a limiting factor to the BS's resource allocation capability which makes this a challenging problem. With partial CSI, resource allocation problems are generally modeled game theoretically and distributed resource allocation algorithms are designed for each UE. As compared to a centralized system in which the decisions are taken by the BS, they are now taken by the UEs through a distributed learning algorithm so as to achieve a certain network objective. This reduces the computational load at the BS as some of the computations are done by the UEs themselves. These systems are generally modeled as non-cooperative in which players take actions to enhance their own utilities. The resulting Nash equilibrium solution sometimes fails to achieve a socially optimum solution since the best response of every player may not maximize the social utility. The inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium is highlighted by the well acknowledged econometric principle, "Tragedy of the Commons", named after the celebrated work of Hardin [5] and can be quantified through the price of anarchy.
B. Related Work
We give an overview of some of the research works pertaining to D2D resource allocation, assuming perfect CSI, in a game-theoretic framework. In [6] , the authors employ a Stackelberg game theoretic framework for joint power control and channel allocation. The existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium (subgame perfect Nash equilibrium) is analyzed. The Stackelberg model is also used in [7] in which the authors state that striving to reach a global maximum is a difficult mathematical feat and is also computationally complex. Thus, they propose a low complexity two-stage algorithm that addresses the power and resource allocation problems separately. However, the proposed algorithm is suboptimal. A reverse iterative combinatorial auction framework is proposed in [8] but the iterative nature of the algorithm increases the communication overhead.
With partial CSI, the application of game theory to D2D resource allocation problems is limited. In [9] , the authors have proposed a distributed power allocation scheme which is modeled as a non-cooperative game. They have shown that a unique Nash equilibrium exists. Though their proposed method does not require global CSI, it requires the knowledge of local CSI which increases the signaling overhead. Moreover, for multiple D2D pairs, they have not addressed the existence of the Nash equilibrium. In [10] , based on the Stackelberg game model, a distributed iterative scheme of resource allocation is proposed. However, due to the iterative nature of the algorithm, signaling overhead is substantial. The authors of [11] propose a centralized graph based resource allocation scheme and model the power control problem as an exact potential game. They show that although a pure strategy Nash equilibrium maximizes the potential function but it may not maximize the social utility of the D2D players. In [12] , the authors propose three learning algorithms for an identical interest game, for a weakly acyclic game and for a weakly acyclic game with noisy utility measurements in which the actions of the players converge to a pure Nash equilibrium. In [13] , two distributed learning algorithms are proposed that solve the coverage optimization problem for sensor networks. It is formulated as a (constrained) exact potential game. Each sensor maximizes its coverage and at the same time ensures that the energy expenditure is reduced. The authors prove that both the algorithms convergence in probability to a set of (constrained) Nash equilibria. However, the players exchange messages among each other which adds to the communication overhead.
In [14] , the authors investigate a different form of equilibrium which is stochastically stable and propose a distributed learning algorithm. In [15] , the authors consider the optimal association of users to base stations. Their work is a modification of the algorithm of [14] . [16] applies the algorithm of [14] for the control of turbines in a wind farm so that its energy production is maximized. The authors of [17] modify the algorithm proposed in [14] to incorporate information exchanges where a bit valued variable is transmitted among the agents. It differs from [14] as it eliminates any structural restrictions on the utilities of the players. Recently, research on some different forms of equilibria like potential function maximizers, correlated equilibria have also been investigated which gives better results than Nash Equilibrium. In [18] the authors investigate the optimal monitoring problem and formulate it as a potential game. They propose a learning algorithm which convergences in probability to the potential function maximizers. In [19] , the authors have proposed a distributed learning algorithm in which the joint distribution of the strategies of players converges to coarse correlated equilibria, where the objective is to maximize the sum of expected payoffs of the players. However, the players need a common random signal. Similarly, in [20] the authors have proposed a learning algorithm where the empirical frequency of the collective strategy of the players corresponds to the coarse correlated (Hannan) equilibrium. The advantage of this algorithm is that it does not require any information exchange among the players.
C. Contributions
In this paper, we employ a game theoretic framework for resource allocation while ensuring that the quality of service (QoS) of the CUs is satisfied which implies that their signalto-interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR) requirements should be met. The contributions of our work are as follows:
• We apply the distributed algorithm proposed in [15] , which is a modification of the algorithm proposed in [14] , to D2D resource allocation which is non-trivial and propose an optimal partially distributed algorithm by considering only pathloss. We demonstrate how interdependence can be designed within the framework of the algorithm proposed in [15] . In both [14] and [15] , no randomness in the system model has been considered, which is a challenging problem.
We have considered fading with mobility of CUs. With this randomness into consideration, we have extended the optimal algorithm and proposed a heuristic algorithm which gives a good performance.
• Our work differs from [15] in that our algorithm is not a completely distributed algorithm. In [15] , time fairness is ensured to the players which are associated to the same BS so that the throughput or utility observed by a player is its transmission rate divided by the total number of players. This results in a decrease in its throughput and thus the network throughput. However, in our algorithm the BS allocates orthogonal resources to the D2D players which ensures that inter-D2D interference does not occur which would have decreased the D2D network's throughput.
• In [15] , when multiple players are associated to a BS, a player's throughput decreases when multiple players are associated with the same BS which results in interdependence. However in our paper, we ensure interdependence in a different way by designing a round robin (RR) based algorithm at the BS and a frame structure from which the utility is calculated. Note that without the BS, inter-D2D interference can also bring about interdependence among the D2D players as each D2D player's rate gets affected due to the interference from the D2D players which are allocated the same resources. However, this would decrease the D2D network's throughput and reduce the throughput of CUs also.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we present the system model which comprises of an underlay D2D network and the game theoretic model of the D2D resource allocation problem. In Section III, we propose an optimal resource allocation algorithm for the D2D players. We next discuss how the system state process is a finite state discrete time Markov chain (DTMC) in Section IV. In Section V, we prove the optimality of the proposed algorithm. We present an example to demonstrate its optimality in Section VI. Next, in Section VII we consider both slow fading and fast fading with CU mobility and propose a heuristic algorithm. We verify the performance of our proposed algorithms through simulations in Section VIII. In Section IX, we summarize our findings.
II. SYSTEM MODEL

A. Network Model
We consider a cell with a BS, N C CUs in uplink transmission mode and N D D2D pairs. We assume that the BS has already allocated resources to these CUs. In an LTE network, resources are blocks of time and frequency. We denote the BS by B, a CU by c and a D2D pair by d. As shown in Fig. 1 , the channel gain between a CU c to the BS B is denoted by g cB and the channel gain between the D2D transmitter to the BS B is given by g dB . We assume that both these channel gains are known at the BS. Similarly, for a D2D pair d, the channel gain between its transmitter and receiver is given by g d . The channel gain between a CU c and the D2D receiver is given by g cd . We assume that the channel gains g d and g cd are not known. We consider the channel to exhibit pathloss.
Let a CU's transmit power be P C and that of a D2D user's be P D . Given that a D2D user d is allocated the resources of a CU c, the SINR of the CU c is given by,
where N 0 is the average noise power.
B. Game Theoretic Model
Let G be a strategic form game with N D D2D players constituting a set and the utility function be
As per the LTE standard, time is divided into subframes of 1 ms duration. We define a frame to consist of N D successive subframes. A subframe is indexed byñ while a frame by n. The start and end of a frame are indexed by mN D + 1 and mN D + N D where m = 0, 1, 2, ... . At the start of a frame n, the action taken by a D2D player d is to select a list l d (n) and transmit it to the BS. The list contains K CUs drawn from a set N C = {c 1 , c 2 , ... , c N C } of available CUs to form a K-tuple. Hence, the total number of lists that a D2D player can generate is K permutations of N C CUs, L = N C P K which constitutes the action set A d of a D2D player. Let the action profile be l = (l 1 , l 2 , ... , l N D ) ∈ A. We denote l −d to be the action profile of the D2D players other than the D2D player d. Therefore, the action profile can also be written as
We design an algorithm at the BS which decides the allocation of CU's resources to the D2D players in each subframeñ as per the lists. Using these resources, each D2D player transmits and observes a rate of r d (ñ) given by,
Definition 1. (Utility) The utility of a D2D player d is calculated at the end of a frame n and is the average of the rates obtained by it over all the subframes of a frame. It is given by,
The algorithm at the BS ensures that the utility of each D2D player is a function of the lists of all the D2D players (action
We normalize the utility r d (n) such that it is strictly bounded between 0 and 1 [14] .
Definition 2. (Social Utility)
The social utility is the sum of utilities of the D2D players in every frame n and is given by
Our objective is to maximize the social utility of the D2D players in every frame n, over all possible action profiles l, to get the socially optimal action profile l * (n), subject to a rate constraint of r tgt d for each D2D player,
III. RESOURCE ALLOCATION ALGORITHM The proposed resource allocation algorithm convergences to the optimal actions provided interdependence is ascertained in the game. Interdependence implies that the utility of every player is affected by the actions of other players. 
We consider the internal state variables of a D2D player to be its list l d (n), its utility r d (n) and another variable called its mood m d (n). We define the present state
The mood can take two values: content (C) and discontent (D). The resource allocation algorithm (refer to Algorithm 1) consists of the following stages: 1) list selection of a D2D player, 2) the BS's resource allocation rule 3) utility calculation of a D2D player and 4) its mood calculation.
A. List Selection
The list selection for every D2D player is done on a frame by frame basis. The mood of a D2D player in the previous RR across a frame frame helps it to select its list in the present frame. Let be the exploration rate, such that > 0 and k is a constant such that k > N D [8] . A D2D player whose mood is content can either retain (exploit) its previous list with probability 1− k or select (explore) a new list with probability k /(L − 1). It is more likely to retain its previous list rather than exploring other lists if k is less than 1 − 1/L. Increasing results in an increase in exploration. However, increasing k results in a decrease in k due to which the probability of exploring becomes less. A discontent D2D player explores all the L possible lists with a probability of 1/L. Steps 2-7 of Algorithm 1 demonstrate the list selection method for a D2D player d. Once this is over for all the D2D players, every D2D player transmits its list to the BS. The BS then allocates the resources of the CUs to the D2D players as per the following allocation algorithm.
B. Allocation Algorithm at the BS 1) RR algorithm: At the beginning of every frame, the lists of all the D2D players are available at the BS. The BS follows a RR sequence in every subframe to prioritize which D2D player's list to select in every subframe. In the first subframe of every frame the BS orders the D2D players in a RR sequence, Fig. 2 which shifts by one in the next subframe so that the RR seq starts from
This continues till the last subframe N D when the RR sequence starts from d N D . Thus, the selection of the first player varies in every subframe of a frame.
2) Orthogonal allocation of resources: In every subframe, the BS ensures orthogonal allocation of CU resources. It selects the first element (a CU) from a D2D player's list and allocates this CU's resources to it if it is not allocated to players prior to it in the RR sequence followed in that subframe (see Fig. 2 ). If this element has already been assigned to another D2D player, the BS selects the next element of the D2D player's list till it reaches the end of the list. In case all the elements of its list are already assigned to the other players, it is not allocated any CU's resource.
3) Interdependence: Interdependence is enforced among the players due to the orthogonal allocation of CUs' resources in a subframe, the RR prioritization of D2D players across subframes and the way in which the utility is calculated. In every subframe, the allocation of a CU's resources to a D2D
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player depends on whether it has been allocated to others or not. This creates dependence of the D2D players on those players appearing before it in the RR sequence. However, in the first subframe the D2D player with the highest priority remains unaffected by the players whose priority is lesser to it. Therefore, when the priority changes in the next subframe, it has to depend on the other players also. In this way all the D2D players get affected due to each other. As seen from Fig. 2 , consider the first subframe and the D2D player d 1 which gets the first priority. It selects a CU c 5 from its list l 1 (n) which does not get affected by the choice of CUs (or lists) of other players because it gets the first precedence over others in the RR sequence followed in the first subframe. Thus, its rate does not depend on the lists (actions) of others. However, as the RR sequence changes in the second subframe, its priority shifts to the next D2D player d 2 . Then the priority of d 1 becomes N D . Thus, its CU selection and its rate gets affected by the choice of CUs (or lists) of other players appearing before it in the RR sequence. When its utility is calculated at the end of a frame as an average of its rates obtained in every subframe, since its rate gets affected due to the lists of others, its utility also gets affected due to the lists of the others. As per Definition 3, this ensures interdependence because a player's utility then depends on the actions of others. 
Select D2D player d's list 6: list index ← 1 7: while list index = list length + 1 do
if c is not assigned to players before d then c's resources are not allocated to d 18: end if 19: index ← index + 1 20: end for 21: Left shift RR seq by 1 22: end function
We now discuss the importance of list selection. If a D2D player does not send a list and instead selects a CU and conveys it to the BS, then the BS in order to ensure interdependence can communicate to it that this CU has already been chosen by another D2D player. So, it needs to choose another CU and convey it to the BS. This can happen many times, which increases the communication overhead between the BS and the D2D player. Instead of this, if the D2D player sends a list to the BS, then the BS can check if the first element of its list is already allocated to another D2D player. If so, then it can select the next element of the D2D player's list. This is equivalent to communicating another choice of CU by the D2D player to the BS. Hence, sending a list reduces the control overhead and also conserves the BS's power and resources.
4) Allocation Test:
In order to ensure that CU communications are not hampered in each subframe, the BS checks whether its SINR decreases below γ tgt due to the interference from the D2D transmitter. If it decreases below γ tgt , the BS does not allocate its resources to the D2D player. Hence, the D2D player's rate r d (ñ) becomes zero. After this test, the BS conveys to each D2D player which CU's resources are allocated to it. The mapping of CUs' resources to the D2D players is termed as an allocation profile. For example, from Fig. 2 if we assume that the CUs c 5 , c 1 , c 3 , . .. , c 8 selected by the BS from the lists l 1 (n) to l N D (n) of the D2D players pass the allocation test, then the allocation profile is (c 5 , c 1 , c 3 , ... , c 8 ) .
C. Utility Calculation
In a subframeñ, a D2D player transmits using the resources of the CU allocated to it and observes a rate r d (ñ). At the end of a frame, it calculates its utility r d (n) as per Eqn. 3.
D. Mood Calculation
The mood of a D2D player is determined (refer to the lines 15-22 of Algorithm 1) at the end of each frame from its previous state, its present list and utility. A content D2D player will remain content, if its present configuration does not not change with respect to its previous one, or else it will remain discontent.
IV. SYSTEM STATE PROCESS
The collection of states of all the D2D players constitute the system state s(n) = (s 1 (n), ... , s N D (n)). Let the action profile in every frame n be l(n) = (l 1 (n), ... , l N D (n)), the utility profile be r(n) = (r 1 (n), ... , r N D (n)) and the mood profile be m(n) = (m 1 (n), ... , m N D (n)).
Lemma 1. ( [14]
, [15] ) The system state process s(n) is a finite state, aperiodic and irreducible DTMC.
Proof. 1) The selection of the present list l d (n) of a D2D player depends on its previous mood and its previous list. Its present mood m d (n) is determined from its previous state. Its utility r d (n) depends on the lists of the other players. Therefore, its present state
depends on its previous state. Hence, the system state process s(n) is a DTMC. 2) Let us rearrange s(n) in terms of the action, utility and mood profiles as s(n) = (l(n), r(n), m(n)). Consider the sets A, U and M to contain all possible values of l(n), r(n) and m(n). Let the set S = A × U × M be the state space of all possible combinations of l(n), r(n) and m(n). We next prove that the system state space S is a subset of S .
Let the cardinality of the space of l(n), r(n) and m(n) be |A|, |U| and |M|. Since each of the N D D2D players can choose any of the L possible lists, |A| = L N D . We know that the utility r d (n) is a function of the action profile l(n), that is, is content, cannot be part of the state space S. Therefore, S is finite and is a subset of S . 3) Since self transitions are possible from every system state, the DTMC is aperiodic. 4) As the system states communicate with each other, they form a single recurrent communication class. Thus, the DTMC is irreducible.
Since the DTMC is finite, aperiodic and irreducible, it is ergodic and has a unique stationary distribution π . Let us denote the transition probability matrix by P which is a perturbed version of P 0 (with equal to zero) [14] , [21] . The transitions in P 0 occur in P with high probabilities. With a very small probability some transitions in P occur which would not have occurred in P 0 . For all states s 1 , s 2 ∈ S, the state transitions P s1s2 converges to P 0 s1s2 as tends to zero, i.e, lim →0 P s1s2 = P 0 s1s2 . Also, the stationary distribution π converges to π 0 as tends to zero, lim →0 π = π 0 , where π 0 is a stationary distribution of P 0 . A state s * is stochastically stable if π 0 s * > 0. We are interested in finding these stochastically stable states, each of which is a tuple of the optimal action profile (the optimal lists), the utility profile which maximizes the social utility such that the rate of each player is satisfied and the mood profile in which each D2D player is content. This solves the problem stated in Eqn. 4.
Theorem 1. ( [14]
, [15] ) The stochastically stable states of a regular perturbed DTMC are the states s * ∈ S, which satisfy the following conditions: 1) The action profile l(n) should maximize the social utility
while satisfying the rate constraints of the D2D players. 2) For each D2D player d, its utility r d (n) should be aligned to the action profile l(n), that is, r d (n) = U d (l).
3) In a stochastically stable state s * , all the D2D players must be content.
We next prove Theorem 1 to show that when we incorporate a frame structure and a RR based algorithm at the BS within the framework of the algorithm of [15] to design interdependence, the system still converges to the stochastically stable states. As in [15] our algorithm ensures probabilistic convergence to Pareto (efficient) actions instead of almost sure convergence. This implies that the system spends most of the time in its optimal states.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We define a few terms as follows [14] , [21] .
Definition 4. (Resistance of Transition)
Let P s1s2 be the transition probability from the system state s 1 to s 2 . If P s1s2 > 0 for some > 0, then there exists a unique real number r s1s2 ≥ 0 called the resistance of transition from s 1 to s 2 such that 0 < lim →0 P s 1 s 2 rs 1 s 2 < ∞. If P 0 s1s2 > 0, then the resistance r s1s2 is zero.
Definition 5. (i-Tree)
In a directed graph G, an i-tree T i is a spanning tree such that there is exactly one directed path from every vertex j = i to i.
Definition 6. (Resistance of an i-Tree) The resistance r
Ti of an i-tree T i is the sum of resistances of its edges.
Definition 7. (Stochastic Potential)
In a directed graph G, the stochastic potential γ i of vertex i is the minimum i-tree resistance among the resistances of all possible i-trees.
Definition 8. (Stochastically Stable
States) The stochastically stable states of a perturbed DTMC with a transition probability matrix P are the states which are contained in the recurrence classes of P 0 with the minimum stochastic potential.
We now identify the different recurrence classes of P 0 .
Lemma 2. ( [14]
, [15] ) The recurrence classes of P 0 are: 1) the class D 0 consisting of all the system states in which every D2D player is discontent and 2) the set of all singleton classes C 0 = {C 0 }, where in each system state C 0 , every D2D player is content.
Proof. 1) In a system state of D 0 , all the D2D players are discontent and explore lists uniformly randomly. As their lists (actions) change, their state changes and thus the action profile also changes. This results in a system state transition. The BS allocates CUs from the lists of the D2D players as per the RR based algorithm in every subframe of a frame. Irrespective of whether the utility of a D2D player r d (n) is greater than r tgt d or not, since is equal to zero every discontent D2D player remains discontent with probability one (refer to the lines 17-22 of Algorithm 1). Thus, a system state in D 0 can only transition to one of the states in D 0 . It cannot transition to any of the content states in C 0 or to any transient state where some of the D2D players are content while others are discontent. Hence, D 0 is a recurrence class of P 0 . A system state s ∈ S in which some of the D2D players are content while others are discontent is a transient state because of the following reason. A discontent D2D player selects its list uniformly randomly and remains discontent with probability one as is zero. Due to the change of actions of the discontent players, the utility of a content D2D player can get affected (interdependence enforced by the BS). Thus, the content D2D player's utility can change, even though its list (action) does not change. Since its configuration changes, that is,
, it becomes discontent with probability one. Gradually, all the content D2D players become discontent. Thus, the state s transitions to one Hence, all such system states s ∈ S are transient.
2) Let us consider a state in C 0 in which every D2D player is content. Referring to Algorithm 1, if is zero, the D2D players retain their previous lists in the present frame with probability one. The action profile of the system therefore remains the same over frames. Due to the RR based allocation at the BS, the set of allocation profiles of a frame also remains the same over all the frames and thus the utility profile also remains the same. As there is no change in any of the D2D player's configuration, every content D2D player remains content. Therefore, a system state in C 0 maintains its state because the action profile, the utility profile and the mood profile remain the same. These are therefore absorbing states and are recurrent.
With perturbation , we now consider the regular perturbed process with transition probability matrix P and determine the stochastic potential of these recurrence classes. Let the stochastic potential of C 0 and D 0 be γ C 0 and γ D 0 respectively. The minimum resistance of transition from C 0 → D 0 , D 0 → C 0 and C 0 → C 0 can be determined as follows. 1) The transition from C 0 to a state in D 0 can occur when at least one content player decides to explore with probability k /(L−1). Its list changes due to which it affects the utility of the other content D2D players and their configuration changes. Thus, content D2D players become discontent. Therefore, the minimum resistance of transition from C 0 to D 0 is k. 2) Similarly, the transition from a system state in D 0 to C 0 occurs when every discontent D2D player explores lists uniformly randomly. From these lists the BS allocates CUs to the D2D players in every subframe. Every D2D player calculates its utility at the end of the frame and if its utility is greater than its target rate r tgt d then it becomes content with probability 1−r d (n) . Thus, the minimum resistance of transition from
3) The transition from a content state to another content state in C 0 can occur when a content D2D player explores. If r d (n) is greater than r tgt d , then the minimum resistance of transition
Let us consider the system state space S to consist of three recurrence classes: D 0 and two singleton classes in the set C 0 . We construct a directed graph G with these recurrence classes as its vertices and denote them by x, y and z. Fig. 3 shows the transitions or edges between the different recurrence classes.
Lemma 3. ( [14], [15] ) The stochastic potential of a recur- Fig. 4 : Example demonstrating the optimal mapping of resources between the CUs and the D2D pairs.
Proof. From graph G of Fig. 3 , there are three possible i-trees, T 1 , T 2 and T 3 that are rooted at vertex y. We represent them by a set of directed edges as follows:
, (x, y)}. The minimum resistances of these three i-trees are r
. Thus, the minimum resistance i-tree is T 3 with resistance r T3 , which is the stochastic potential of C 0 . If the total number of states in C 0 is |C 0 |, then the stochastic potential of C 0 is given by Proof. From graph G, we note that there are three possible i-trees rooted at the vertex x, T 1 = {(y, x), (z, x)}, T 2 = {(z, y), (y, x)} and T 3 = {(y, z), (z, x)}. The minimum resistance of these i-trees are r T1 = 2k and r T2 = r T3 = 2k + min d∈N d (1 − r d (n) ). Thus, T 1 is the i-tree with the minimum resistance r T1 , which is the stochastic potential of
The stochastic potential of C 0 is therefore less than that of D 0 , i.e., γ C 0 < γ D 0 . Thus, the stochastically stable states are present in the recurrence classes of C 0 which have the minimum stochastic potential.
The optimal action profile l * (n) is the one that minimizes γ C 0 and is given by,
which is equivalent to maximizing the social utility,
This completes the proof.
VI. CONCEPT ILLUSTRATION
We demonstrate through the following example how our algorithm converges to a Pareto optimal solution such that at least one of the player's utility is the best with none of the other players' utilities any worse off either. We consider a simple topology to illustrate how the social utility can be maximized. In order to theoretically calculate it we assume that all the channel gains are known. We can then determine the rates of the D2D players. We then show through simulations that our proposed algorithm also gives the same value of the social utility. 2) Parameter Setting: Let R 1 = 50 m and R 2 = 100 m. Every D2D transmitter subtends an angle of 10 degree at the BS with respect to its receiver. The distance between a D2D transmitter and receiver is 17.43 m. Let P D and P C be equal to 10 mW, the path loss exponent α = 2, the pathloss model be 1/d α , N 0 = 0.1 mW, B = 1 Hz and γ tgt = 0 dB. We set r tgt d of each D2D player to 50 % of the rates that they achieve when the allocation profile is (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ). 3) Analysis: The distances of the CUs and the D2D transmitters to the BS are R 1 and R 2 . The powers received from the CUs are the same. The powers received from the D2D transmitters are also the same. Hence, the SINRs of all the CUs are the same no matter what the allocation profile is. We assume the SINRs to be higher than γ tgt .
The best CU for a D2D player is one which is farthest from a D2D player's receiver. (c 2 , c 3 , c 1 ) is an optimal allocation profile. The allocation profile a 2 = (c 3 , c 1 , c 2 ) is also optimal. With allocation profile a 1 = (c 2 , c 3 , c 1 ), the rates of the D2D players are r d1 = 0.4076, r d2 = 0.4076 and r d3 = 0.4089 bps. Thus, the utility profile r(n) is (0.4076, 0.4076, 0.4089). Therefore, the maximum value of the social utility is the sum of these rates which is 1.224 bps. 4) Verification: We simulate Algorithm 1 with the above topology and parameter setting. We set = 0.5 and k = 11. Let the mood m d = 1 when a player is content and m d = 0 when it is discontent. Normalized mood is the average of the moods of all the players. When they are content it is one when atleast one player is discontent it is less than one. We then obtain a plot of the social utility and the normalized mood of the D2D players across the frames as shown in Fig. 5 . We observe from Fig. 5 that the maximum value of the social utility of the D2D players is 1.224 bps with the normalized mood equal to one. This matches our theoritical calculation. Two of the optimal action profiles are as follows: l *
. When the action profile is l * 1 (n), the BS as per the RR based algorithm determines the optimal allocation profile as (c 2 , c 3 , c 1 ) in every subframe. When the action profile is l * 2 (n), the optimal allocation profile is (c 3 , c 1 , c 2 ) in every subframe. These allocation profiles match our theoretically obtained ones. Thus, these two optimal action profiles, their corresponding utility profiles and the content mood profiles constitute two stochastically stable states.
VII. FADING AND CU MOBILITY
We now consider slow fading due to shadowing as well as fast fading. When the CUs are mobile and their location information is unavailable, devising efficient resource allocation algorithms for the D2D players is a challenging task. The mobility of a CU is characterized by its velocity and direction of movement. The distance of a CU to the D2D player's receiver changes with time when the CU is mobile. Thus, the D2D player's SINR and its rate vary over subframes. When the channel model is a pathloss model then an action profile maps to a unique utility profile. However, with fading and mobility, an action profile can generate infinite utility profiles. Thus, the number of states in the DTMC becomes infinite and the system states become transient. Therefore, for this DTMC, the steady state distribution π does not exist and thus π 0 does not exist. Thus, Algorithm 1 fails to converge. We modify it and devise a novel utility calculation method such that on an average the system performance does not degrade. This method is threshold based and the main concept is to detect a significant change in the network topology and the channel due to which the resource allocation would change.
A. Threshold Based Utility Calculation
We modify Algorithm 1 so that a frame is repeated N D times to form a superframe which is indexed byn. The list selection by a D2D player and its mood calculation occurs at epochs which are multiples of a superframe instead of a frame. The list generation occurs at the beginning of each superframe, the allocation method at the BS remains the same and the mood calculation is done at the end of a superframe. In Algorithm 1 the index n for a frame will be replaced witĥ n for a superframe. The start of a superframe is indexed by mN In any subframeñ, two pieces of information are available x ← x + 1 3:
ifñ == mN 
to a D2D player d: 1) the c th CU whose resources are allocated to it and 2) its rate r d (ñ) when it transmits using this CU's resources. In a continuum of subframes, a CU c's resources can be allocated to it several times, though it may not be allocated exactly in two consecutive subframes.
However, every time that it is allocated this CU's resources, it observes a change in its rate as a result of the CU's mobility and the channel. Let us say that in the first frame of length N D of a superframe, it is allocated the resources of different CUs. It stores this sequence of CUs in a vector a d of length N D . Every time it observes that CU c's (which has passed the allocation test) resources are allocated to it, it calculates a running average of its previous rates observed with this CU over subframes and the present rate using Monte Carlo (MC) averaging and stores it in a vector r a of length N C at its c th index. It also stores the number of times that it is allocated CU c's resources in a vector n d of length N C at its c th index. This is required for the MC averaging which is also done for all the other CUs whose resources are allocated to it. When this CU's resources are allocated for the first time to it, then its rate is updated in r a at its c th index. It also maintains a vector u d of length N C . At the end of every superframe, it checks the entries of u d and in whichever indices of u d it finds a zero, it stores the average rates of r a from these indices to u d . If it finds non-zero entries in some indices of u d , then it calculates an absolute difference of these entries with those of r a . If any of the resultants exceed a threshold ∆, then the values of u d at those indices are updated with the corresponding values of r a .
At the end of a superframen, it retrieves the rates from the indices of the vector u d , where the indices are the contents of the vector a d . It then sums up these rates and divides it by N D to obtain its utility r d (n). Its mood is then determined from its utility, its list and its previous state as per the mood calculation method of Algorithm 1. 
VIII. RESULTS
In this section, we verify the performances of the proposed algorithms. The simulation parameters are as follows. We consider a circular cell model whose radius is 250 m in which the CUs (N C = 10) and the D2D transmitters (N D = 10) are uniformly distributed. A D2D receiver is uniformly distributed around a D2D transmitter within a range of 50 m. The same seed is used for the simulation results. Let P C = 250 mW and P D = 1 mW. We consider the LTE pathloss model, P L = 128.1 + 37.6 log (d). The UE and BS noise figures are 9 dB and 5 dB respectively. The thermal noise density is -174 dBm. We assume that each CU is allocated two physical resource blocks (PRBs) of 180 kHz bandwidth. Let γ tgt = 0 dB and the minimum rate r tgt d for each D2D player be 50 % of the rates observed by them in their initial positions.Note that the total number of lists L from which a D2D player can select a list depends on the length of a list because L = N C P K . If K increases, L increases and the number of bits to transmit a list increases. Therefore, we set the length of the lists to 3. Fig. 6 demonstrates the performance of Algorithm 1 with two different values of and k. We choose and k through trial and error. When choosing these design parameters we must note that the exploration probability depends on them. If it is very high then the D2D players explore more due to which the duration for which the system states are maintained becomes small. If it is very low then the D2D players explore so less that the transition from one system state to another occurs infrequently and the system may not be able to find the stochastically stable states. We set = 0.7 and k = 23 and then increase to 0.8 and k to 31 which results in the exploration rate to increase and the D2D players explore lists more often. Thus, their individual utilities change more often due to a change in the action profile which is reflected in the fluctuations observed in the social utility of the D2D players. The average social utility of the D2D players over frames is approximately 5 Mbps. 
A. Without Fading and Mobility of CUs
B. With Fading and Mobility of CUs
We model slow fading with lognormal random variables (RVs) of standard deviation 8 dB. For fast fading we model the channel gains as independent and exponentially distributed RVs with mean 1.
Mobility Model: We employ the following model to characterize the mobility of the CUs. The CUs start from their initial positions and choose directions that are uniformly distributed between 0 and 360 degree. We assume a constant pedestrian speed of 1 m/s for all the CUs. The number of subframes T for which it travels till it changes its direction is a geometrically distributed RV with mean (1 − p)/p, where p is the probability of success in each trial. We set p = 10 −5 . The CU after T subframes does not pause unlike the random direction model, instead it again chooses a direction that is randomly uniformly distributed. When it hits the boundary of the circular cell, it chooses a random direction. The range of angles that it can choose from is limited because it should not cross the boundary. If the time when it hits the boundary is a fraction in milliseconds then the decimal part needs to be truncated because the subframes are of 1 ms duration and the position of a CU is assumed to be sampled at the start of every subframe. Thus, the resulting distance is within the boundary. This model differs from the random direction model because the pause times are zero [22] and the speed is constant instead of a uniformly distributed RV.
When we incorporate the threshold based utility calculation method in Algorithm 1, we observe the following results with ∆ = 0.01 when the factor by which the rates are normalized is 10 Mbps. Fig. 7 shows a typical sample path realization of the social utility of the D2D players over superframes with and k equal to 0.7 and 31. We increase to 0.8 and k to 35 and observe that the D2D players explore more. The average social utility of the D2D players is approximately 6 Mbps.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed an optimal resource allocation algorithm for D2D players in a game theoretic framework that ensures that the social utility is maximized and the CU communications are not hampered. We explain the notion of stochastically stable states and prove that it is in these system states that a D2D network's social utility is maximized. We also extend this algorithm and propose a heuristic algorithm that shows good performance in a fading channel with CU mobility.
